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vineri, 10 februarie 2017

The Build-Up to the Greek Crisis and its ImpactThe Build-Up to the Greek Crisis and its Impact Axel Sotiris WalldénAxel Sotiris Walldén

From 2008 to 2015, Greece lost 26% of its GDP. This is one of the greatest recessions ever recorded worldwide in peacetime, comparable to the 1929 Great Depression. Other south European countries hit by crises registered cumulative GDP drops ranging from 3 to 8%. And while these latter countries have been recovering in the past few years, Greece’s GDP remains largely flat since 2013. Today, Greece ranks 22nd among the 28 EU member states in terms of per capita GDP (in purchasing power parities), down seven positions from 2008.
In terms of unemployment, Greece is the champion among EU nations, with an impressive 25% in 2015, as against 9.4% for the EU average and 4.6% for Germany. In 2008 Greece, Germany and the EU average were at the same level of 7-8%. Greece tops the EU list also with respect to unemployment among youth, which is 50%, as against 20% for the EU average. In 2008 youth unemployment was less than half as high in Greece (22%). And these figures do not take into account the massive emigration, especially of educated young people, that is taking place since the crisis broke out.
The fall in incomes and living standards is even more dramatic than GDP figures would suggest. Wages and pensions have sometimes been cut by 50% or more, while prices have hardly followed. Taxes have been raised. Public services, notably in the health sector and in education have deteriorated sharply. Small enterprises and shops have been closing by the thousands. Poverty has risen sharply and an increasing number of citizens have to rely on charity for their daily food. We have cases of pupils fainting in school because of malnutrition. The number of suicides has risen. Predictably, the most strongly affected have been the unemployed, but also middle strata. But inequalities have also increased, meaning that there are also winners from this catastrophe. 
This is not the picture of a European country. And, surely, such a landscape of devastation cannot have been the objective of policies intended to help the country! Yet, this is what they undeniably brought.
Of equal importance is the prevailing mood in the country. Polls show that Greeks top the European list of pessimism for the future. People can see no light at the end of the tunnel; they feel their children have no future in this country and encourage them to emigrate. Such a climate is hardly compatible with the necessary major national effort to redress the country.

The build-up to the crisis
How did we get here? 
Well, for decades the Greek economy and society has been suffering from serious structural deficiencies. Gone long since are the days when this country posed as a capitalist tiger, successfully competing with its neighbouring communist states, albeit with an ailing democracy or even with military rule. Already in the seventies, Greece’s economic dynamism started abating. Growth rates dropped, external balances became precarious, competitiveness eroded. A clientelist political system became a major obstacle to modernisation, protecting privileges, tax evasion, a highly inefficient and corrupt state and nurturing reform aversion. Accession to the EU in 1981 brought some elements of modernisation, but also had substantial perverse effects. Massive transfers from European funds and a psychology of security within the EU created a cushion of complacency which hid underlying problems.
There were of course ups and downs, good periods and less good ones. The coming to power for the first time of a socialist government under Andreas Papandreou in the early eighties, in addition to the political liberalisation it brought, allowed for much-needed social reforms and the strengthening of the welfare state, even though the economics of the new government were sometimes flawed. The second half of the eighties witnessed a rapid degeneration of the socialist government, with scandals and corruption attaining record levels and eventually leading to political instability. In the early nineties a short-lived attempt by the conservative government under Konstantinos Mitsotakis to implement a neo-liberal agenda proved an utter failure.
The period 1996-2003 under socialist Prime Minister Simitis were arguably the best years in our recent history. Simitis managed to stabilise the economy and thus bring the country into the euro area, while ensuring rising living standards and implementing a social-democratic agenda. By the way, it is not true, as some foreign critics claim, that the country was smuggled into the Eurozone by fudging the statistics. Some ‘creative accounting’ did take place, but it was minor and fully comparable to similar practices by other Eurozone countries. In our times of generalised bashing of Greece, one should recall that in the early millennium years there was general consensus that Greece was now performing well, in terms of economy, foreign policy and general governance. Greeks remember this period as one of increasing prosperity, symbolised by the inauguration of the excellent Athens Metro and the Athens peripheral motorway in the run up to the Olympic Games; Balkan neighbours recall the important 2003 EU-Western Balkan Thessaloniki summit. I personally remember highly flattering comments on Greece and its government by partners in the EU institutions. I even recall internal debates within the Greek administration on whether we should adopt a tough line vis-à-vis Germany and France who had violated the Maastricht criteria!
Simitis did not succeed in healing all the deficiencies of the political system, though. Corruption, in particular, remained high and probably even increased. Also, the general feeling we were on the right path, contributed to underestimating the urgency of certain reforms. An attempt to overhaul the heavily ailing pension system met with massive opposition in society and was abandoned.
However, the actual derailing of the Greek economy essentially took place during the years 2004-2009 under the conservative government of Kostas Karamanlis (not to be confused with Konstantinos Karamanlis, the long-standing PM and President of the Republic by the same name, an uncle of the younger Karamanlis). Karamanlis’ laissez-faire attitude towards the economy and governance in general –his period was labelled as that of the ‘automatic pilot’-, went hand in hand with a spectacular rise of clientelism. People were recruited by the thousands in an already highly inefficient administration. Public funds were massively allocated to political friends and clients. Incomes were allowed to rise without due consideration of the economic constraints. Greece borrowed excessively from abroad, profiting from low interest rates in the Eurozone. The country’s competitiveness further declined and the budget deficit exploded, reaching a spectacular 15% of GDP in 2009, which was concealed in the official statistics in what, this time, was a major falsification.
Karamanlis was succeeded in 2009 by a socialist government under Giorgos Papandreou, the son of the already mentioned Andreas Papandreou, who was also the son of a PM. (Incidentally, please note the dominant nepotism in Greek mainstream politics: the Papandreou and Karamanlis dynasties, but also that of the Mitsotakis family –the current leader of the conservative opposition Kyriakos being the son of former PM Konstantinos and the brother of a long-standing minister, Dora Bakoyannis). Papandreou came to power just about when the crisis broke out, but was in full denial of it: ‘Money is available’ was a central slogan of his pre-election campaign. And the months it took for him to realise where we stood added to the disastrous situation.
It would be unfair, however, to omit to mention the role played by international factors, in addition to the domestic ones:
First, the EU and the Eurozone. If Greece borrowed excessively during its first years within the Eurozone, obviously someone lent it excessively. And the lenders were basically big French and German banks, which financed -among other things- large defence procurements and public works. Clearly, there is something wrong with a currency union that creates incentives for such behaviour. And, clearly the complacency shown by national and European supervisory authorities to the derailing of the economy of a member state must have had a cause: incompetence of these authorities, irresponsible support to export industries, or other reasons. Most Greeks remember Commission President Barroso in pre-electoral tour in Greece in 2007, supporting his party-friend Karamanlis and praising the achievements of the Greek economy, just two years before its total collapse.
The second international factor was of course the global financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The volatility shown by financial markets and the major run on bonds of a government that was normally considered safe as part of the Eurozone are undoubtedly largely the result of that crisis. This in its turn testifies to a highly problematic functioning of the world capitalist economy. One would never imagine the excesses of a tiny country triggering panic on a world scale and disastrously feeding back into the Greek economy, were it not for this global dysfunction. 
Thus, the Greek crisis was definitely the making of domestic factors, but its extent and acuteness are the result of Greece becoming a weak link in a problematic global and European environment.
I should maybe mention that my narrative on the build-up to the crisis is not an uncontested one. Some voices from the right would not agree that their government in the years immediately preceding the crisis was the main responsible for the derailment; they would rather attribute the crisis to the long hegemony of the socialists since the 1980s. Some voices from the left tend to condemn all previous governments back-to-back as expressions of a rotten system, thus trying to justify in my view their own sectarian record of vehement opposition to the social-democrat Simitis and their tolerance of Karamanlis’ populist laxness. Also, one often hears from abroad sweeping judgements and stereotypes according to which Greece was a basket-case since the beginning of times. In my view, they are wrong: until the early 2000s, Greece, despite its problems, was not in an ineluctable path of collapse. On the contrary, there were fair chances it would manage to consolidate a decent position within the EU.

A medicine that proved toxic
Be it as it is, in early 2010 Greece, with huge budgetary and current account deficits and a sizeable foreign debt, found herself abruptly excluded from international financial markets, facing the immediate prospect of an unorderly bankruptcy. Being a member of the Eurozone, devaluation was not an option. Solidarity and assistance from the EU were desperately needed.
Yet, the reaction from EU partners was tardive, incoherent, largely punitive, narrowly selfish and technically highly incompetent.
Europe has a habit of postponing difficult decisions, which it did this time too. However, it was soon realised that a chaotic collapse of Greece could bring down the creditor European banks and indeed trigger a new crisis of global dimensions through a domino effect on other Eurozone countries; that could well mean the end of the euro. So, Greece was lent enormous sums, totalling € 330 bn; this kept it from defaulting, but further increased its debt. A hair-cut of non-official debt was also implemented, but proved wholly insufficient. In parallel, the creditors imposed on the country hard measures aimed at redressing the budgetary balance and improving competitiveness.
Alas, the course that was adopted and the character of the measures, in no way assisted Greece to address the crisis and recover from it in a sustainable way. The priorities dominating the three successive programmes imposed on the country from 2010 to 2015 can be summed up to the following: saving the creditor banks rather than the Greek economy; honouring the no-bail out clause in the Eurozone statutes; achieving repayment of the debt at a pace and on terms that proved incompatible with the recovery of the economy; implementing massive privatisations aimed solely at obtaining cash for debt repayment; imposing reforms through a major internal devaluation, meaning a radical cut of incomes and a disbandment of the welfare state; deregulating the labour market beyond European standards. The concepts behind this approach were of course the dominant neo-liberal philosophy, German hegemonism and also the notion of ‘moral hazard’: other Eurozone countries had to be discouraged from behaving like Greece, hence Greece had to be severely punished. And the punishment went along the lines of ‘collective responsibility’; the population at large was to be penalised.
In Germany and elsewhere in northern Europe the Greek drama nurtured a populistic rhetoric: industrious Germans and north Europeans were paying for profligate Greeks and other Southerners. The dysfunctions of the Eurozone were wholly attributable to the South. The stereotype of the lazy Greek who enjoys the sun and the sea while the others are working –a myth discarded by statistics- was spread not only by tabloids and populist magazines, but even by persons such as Ms Merkel, as it supported the official German opposition to a so-called ‘transfer union’, meaning a union where rich countries have to pay in return for the advantages they enjoy at the expense of others through the Union. Unsurprisingly, this propaganda was music to the ears of anti-Europeans and nationalists and Ms Merkel had later to dissociate herself from it.
Intentionally or not, EU and IMF forecasts grossly underestimated the effects of the programmes on the Greek economy, notably on the GDP and employment. Evidently, it would have been much more difficult to impose these programmes, had it been clear from the outset that they would bring the effects just described. Besides its disastrous effects on the population, the therapy did not achieve most of its proclaimed aims. It did bring the budget deficit to balance and it also drastically reduced the balance of payments deficit, the latter exclusively through contraction of imports resulting from austerity and curtailment of investments. But, predictably, the country hardly benefited at all from a strategy based exclusively on reducing labour costs, a strategy that is obviously inappropriate for an EU country. Privatisations proved unfeasible at the prescribed scale. And the general disorder and atmosphere created by such extreme austerity rendered impossible any implementation of serious and needed reforms. As a result, the foreign debt skyrocketed further, reaching a spectacular 180% of GDP (which according to the IMF could further increase in coming years). The whole logic of the rescue was to push the bucket down the road, perpetually lending Greece so that it would pay its previous debts and ignoring the effects on the economy and society.
How did the country react?
The crisis shook the very foundations of the Greek political system. The Papandreou government, belatedly awakening to the situation, promptly fell in line with the demands of the Eurozone diréctoire. At some point, Papandreou tried to proclaim an ambiguous referendum –ambiguous because it was unclear whether he was asking citizens to support or reject the EU diktats. That was beyond what Merkel and Sarkozy would tolerate and the Greek PM was brutally reprimanded in pure neo-colonial style; the referendum was aborted and Papandreou resigned shortly after. 
A coalition government was formed with the two main parties, first under a technocrat, Bank of Greece Governor Papademos, and subsequently under conservative New Democracy leader Samaras, notorious for his dismal nationalist record on the Macedonian issue as FM back in the nineties. New Democracy, while still in opposition, had opposed the programme, but when co-opted into the government also fell in line. Some outbursts of feeble resistance were quickly abandoned. The coalition partners were soon claiming the ownership of imposed reforms, sometimes going as far as presenting them as the only salvation of the country. They saw no problem in agreeing with the lenders that the Greek debt was sustainable, a fiction maintained by the Germans to avoid addressing the sensitive issue of debt relief. They also repeatedly promised that austerity was over, no further measures were to be taken, only to announce new ones shortly after. 
Not surprisingly, society reacted largely in furore. There was some limited support to the measures. A few self-proclaimed reformists adopted an attitude of self-flagellation. Greece and its people were guilty, the lenders were well meaning partners, if not parents who justly punished their delinquent child. The few authentic neo-liberals in this country seized the opportunity to make their point on TINA (‘there is no alternative’). Others still, more sober, argued in terms of realism that we had no choice but to accept the prevailing attitudes in Europe and hence it made no sense to protest; we should rather do our homework and await better days.
But this was not the general mood. Calvinist morals were never popular in this orthodox country; neo-liberalism had always been a marginal current, in minority even among conservatives; and there was a long tradition of resistance to policies imposed from abroad. Most importantly, it soon became obvious that the medicine was highly toxic. In other European countries, measures that amounted to a small fraction of the austerity that was imposed on the Greeks provoked real social uprisings. So, no wonder the reaction was strong. This is, by the way, where the ‘realists’ erred: their realism did not extend to the social and political sustainability of the therapy.
People started turning out to the streets and the political debate took a nasty turn. Ms Merkel’s portraits were painted with swastikas, pro-memorandum supporters were labelled collaborators and sometimes harassed, conspiracy theories against the EU and Germany were resuscitated. Such extreme behaviour was of course exploited by populists in Germany and the north-south rift deepened. However, the vast majority of those who reacted to the programmes were neither anti-European, nor anti-German. They were naturally reacting to their abrupt pauperisation which they did not attribute to their own genes or laziness, but to a rotten political elite, which now posed unconvincingly as their saviour, and to an egoistic European leadership, in which they had until then believed.
The credibility of the two major parties suffered heavily, the main victim being socialist PASOK, both because of the traditional progressive leanings of its electorate and because that party’s leadership proved the most eager to assume ownership of the reforms. Its ratings dropped from above 40% to single-digit figures.
The rise of SYRIZA and the moment of truth
It is in this context of massive pauperisation, of a social tissue torn apart, of paralysis of public administration, of polarised politics and of total discrediting of the major political parties that the rapid course to power of SYRIZA started.
In 2010, SYRIZA was still a small radical left party, struggling to stay above the 3% threshold to remain in Parliament. It was strongly supportive of social protest movements, sometimes lenient towards violent protests. As most such parties, it denounced the establishment without bothering too much to articulate coherent alternative policies. It had of course no experience of government. On the other hand, SYRIZA was not anti-European or Stalinist (though it counted some supporters of both these currents within its ranks). It advocated the reform of the EU and had positive agendas on the environment, social policies and immigration; its origins were mostly from the reformist communists, since Greece had and still has a sizeable purely Stalinist Communist Party.
The crisis with the demise of PASOK was the golden opportunity SYRIZA seized. With its young leader Tsipras, who eventually proved quite charismatic, and a populist agenda, SYRIZA’s influence grew rapidly. It accused the ruling parties of being ‘yes men’ and corrupt. It denounced the political establishment and the programmes; and it promised that, once in power, it would summarily tear the latter, abolish austerity and erase the debt in a stroke. 
Few believed SYRIZA would fulfil all its promises. Greeks are used to pre-electoral demagogy and take it with a pinch of salt. They remember how Andreas Papandreou had promised leaving the EEC and NATO and indeed bringing socialism on the day he came to power, only to settle with much more modest –yet important- reforms when that day came. But SYRIZA succeeded in giving some hope to a desperate people. A growing number of Greeks were exasperated with the inhuman austerity that fell upon them; they were fed up with the ruling parties and their corruption and wanted new faces; they wished a more dignified relationship with Europe; and they would probably be satisfied if Tsipras fulfilled a fraction of his promises.
The rise of SYRIZA spread panic to the establishment. Tsipras was perceived as a deadly threat to the political system, indeed to the nation itself. He was charged with all the failures. It was not the lousy governance by the traditional parties, nor the design and implementation of the programmes that were responsible for the Greek tragedy, but SYRIZA’s demagogy and support to popular opposition. The coalition parties proved incapable of grasping the extent of the resentment caused by the policies they were implementing. They could not imagine the country being governed by others than themselves. And they could not either see that the country was fortunate to be turning to a pro-European left and not to an anti-European, xenophobic and fascist extreme right or to maverick parties, as mostly happens in other European countries. An extreme right, indeed in its ugliest form of neo-Nazism, did grow in Greece too during the crisis, but fortunately remained largely in minority.
Tsipras eventually managed to topple the Samaras government over the election of the new President of the Republic, an election requiring qualified majority in Parliament. He won the January 2015 elections and formed a government in coalition with a small populist rightist party. He then swiftly lowered his demands. There was no longer an insistence on nominal debt relief and most of his negotiating positions were more moderate than what the IMF proposes today, notably on the long-term primary budgetary surplus and the extent of austerity it would entail. True, the rhetoric was often aggressive and sometimes gave the impression that SYRIZA was out to bring about some sort of European revolution. More importantly, the government evidently underestimated the power of hard-core forces, rallying around German finance minister Schäuble and having a hardly hidden agenda for Grexit. 
The Greek government’s real objective during the protracted negotiations with the lenders that took place in the first half of 2015 was to obtain a result that would be marginally better than the existing situation, thus vindicating the struggle it waged. It did succeed to politicise the Greek issue on a world scale, an issue that was otherwise obscured in technocratic jargon. Its main argument, that the Greek people had suffered enough and that the programmes were a failure, did win some international sympathy, for instance in the Obama Administration or in the new socialist French government. However, the objective of the extremist group around Schäuble was the exact opposite: to humiliate Tsipras, so that no one else –say Spain- follows the same path. Indeed, Schäuble aimed to effectively expel Greece from the Eurozone (by the way something that is not foreseen by the EU treaties), thus starting a process of forming a narrower Eurozone of ‘the fittest’. The Greek government’s aggressive tactics and lack of experience facilitated its own isolation and the Grexit plans.
With Berlin and Brussels daily predicting an oncoming Grexit, and with the European Central Bank gradually strangulating the Greek banking system of liquidity, citizens reacted rationally: they massively withdrew their money from the banks. The situation became untenable: capital controls had to be imposed, and the country was on the brink of a chaotic default, while the collapse of its banking system was imminent.
At that moment, Tsipras opted controversially for a fuite en avant, by proclaiming a referendum on the EU proposals. His objective was to strengthen his negotiating position, not to pave the way for Grexit. However, the European establishment and the domestic opposition claimed that citizens were voting about leaving or staying in Europe. Greeks rejected the latter dilemma and massively supported their Government, by an impressive 61%, a clear indication of the nation’s mood and exasperation. But Tsipras had apparently miscalculated the effect of his victory on his European partners. The Greek defiance proved the opportunity sought by those who wished to orchestrate Grexit. Faced with the immediate prospect of a disastrous expulsion, Tsipras made a sudden U-turn, by-passing minority voices within his party that were advocating a rupture. He was forced to sign a rather humiliating new memorandum, the price for a new €84 bn loan, while the more moderate European forces managed in extremis to defeat the group around Schäuble who were still aiming at Grexit.

Uphill struggle for the country and for SYRIZA
Following the July 2015 deal, Tsipras has to implement policies that are the exact opposite of his philosophy and earlier promises, indeed policies which he had always claimed were disastrous and unsustainable. His predecessors can now claim they were right when they said they had no alternative but to do what they did. Yet, SYRIZA held that it at least had tried and had fought a heroic battle; it had backed, when it saw the lenders were prepared to expel to country from the Eurozone, which proved that SYRIZA had no Grexit agenda, contrarily to what the opposition claimed; and now, even with the constraints of the new programme, a SYRIZA government would be different from its predecessors: it would exploit existing margins to follow a more socially sensitive and progressive course; it was not corrupt; it would better negotiate debt relief; and it would position itself in Europe with the forces fighting for a change of course.
To the surprise of many, the electorate approved once again SYRIZA in snap elections held in September 2015. This time Tsipras’ victory could not be attributed to pre-electoral demagogy; rather, Greek citizens, despite everything, approved his resistance and still trusted him more than his predecessors. The opposition’s strategy of an all-out attack on SYRIZA and their siding with the lenders proved counter-productive.
Still, the SYRIZA government is faced with an almost impossible task. The cumulative effects of six years of austerity, past and new, are intensely felt. Even marginal further curtailing of incomes generates strong reactions. The bank run and the capital controls –irrespective of whether they should be attributed to the government’s mismanagement or to the lenders’ blackmail- have had negative effects on the economy, albeit not as important ones as initially predicted. And, of course, SYRIZA is inexperienced in government and rather confused ideologically after last summer’s volte-face.
Needless to stress that my description of last year’s events is not shared by the government’s opponents. For the opposition, the irresponsible maximalism of SYRIZA caused a national catastrophe at the moment the country was about to exit the crisis. The opposition parties voted in Parliament for the new programme, but subsequently oppose all the measures prescribed in it, claiming they are the making of an incompetent Government. In this they seem to copy the populism of SYRIZA, probably assuming that if it worked for Tsipras, it will now work for them as well. As a result, the Greek political scene remains as polarised as ever. The opposition aims at an immediate overthrow of the Government, but its tactics have up to now remained ineffective, probably because no one has a serious alternative to propose. This is probably also the reason why the government now receives support from foreign capitals and leaders, some of whom do not hesitate to highly praise the Greek PM, to the dismay of domestic opposition.
However, it is quite possible that the vicious circle in which Greece has plunged will bring down this government as well in the not too distant future. And then what? No plausible positive scenario is on offer. 
You will understand that, in my view, there is little ground for optimism as long as Greece is obliged to implement the imposed programme. I highly respect and support the ambition of the present government to make a difference, even within this framework; I note their efforts to imprint a social dimension on the measures they take and to relaunch growth; and I strongly believe this country has nothing to gain from seeing the old faces back in power. But, frankly I am convinced the present course is not sustainable, economically, socially or politically.
Is there any hope? Well, maybe yes. The non-sustainability of present Eurozone and EU policies in general, and of those imposed on Greece in particular is increasingly acknowledged. The recent dispute between the IMF, which obviously has US backing, and Berlin is exactly about this; views for a more open policy towards Greece have emerged even within the Eurozone hard core. It is ironic, yet comforting, to hear ECB officials, the Eurogroup chair and others join their voices to that of the IMF in declaring Greek debt unsustainable and advocating substantial debt relief and much lower primary surpluses than those imposed just a few months ago. All these voices are now saying exactly what the Greek government said last year and was severely punished as a heretic for that. So, after all, Tsipras was basically right last year. His demands were neither unreasonable nor revolutionary. His real sin was that he miscalculated the brutal intentions of a hard-core group within the Eurozone.
What lies behind this change? Most probably reality itself, which shows the impasse of present policies at Greek and at European level. Also, the refugee crisis has added a heavy burden on the Greek economy and raised some sympathy for the government’s humane attitude. It is increasingly realised that Greece cannot play the role of a buffer it has been unilaterally assigned by EU governments in the refugee crisis, without some support. Also, SYRIZA is to be credited for making Greece’s voice and situation heard at a global scale.
Are we then about to witness a turn for the better in the lenders’ attitude towards Greece? Unfortunately, this is not secured. The broader European developments do not seem to favour the strengthening of solidarity within the EU. Faced with the challenge of extreme-right, anti-European and nationalist forces, mainstream Europe clings to its economic policies, while adopting in part the nationalist agenda, notably on refugees and migration. With respect to Greece, the strategists of a small Eurozone without Greece and other southerners are still working on their project and could exploit the Brexit referendum, whatever its outcome. The architects of the programmes are still defending their destructive work. Their present strategy seems to be to postpone again any major decision until after the 2017 German elections. But time is not on Greece’s side. The present programme brings catastrophe every day that passes. And then, before the German elections, we have the French elections with Ms Le Pen lurking, while the German elections themselves are hardly likely to produce a Bundestag more favourable to Greece. So changing the course is a matter of urgency.
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Let me conclude:
The Greek crisis does not have its roots in the DNA of the Greek people, but definitely in domestic factors, long-standing structural deficiencies and mismanagement by the political establishment. However, the tragedy we are witnessing during the past six years is largely the result of an ill-designed therapy imposed by Greece’s creditors. The country’s present political landscape is the product of the crisis and very much of the disastrous therapy forced upon it. The demise of the old political system is a natural and welcome outcome; and the rise of a radical left, that remains pro-European in the midst of the present European chaos and has become increasingly responsible, is probably the best of possible options for this country. 
Let it be clear that an exit of Greece from the Eurozone is, in my view, in no way a solution. First, because a go-it-alone strategy is not advisable, particularly for a small country like Greece, for both economic and geopolitical reasons. But also because a transition back to a national currency under present conditions would be even more painful than the therapy we are undergoing. This view is shared by the Government and, apparently, by a large majority of Greeks, although, increasingly, it is only fear that makes them reluctant to leave.
Our nations, including the larger member states, are simply too small to face separately the challenges of a globalised world. We need Europe to defend and develop our freedoms and our way of life, the European social model. It is by struggling within a Europe to change it for the better, and not by destroying or leaving it that we have a chance of succeeding.
On the other hand, I can see no exit from the crisis while the creditors continue to apply their punitive therapy. However, my hope is that realities in Greece and developments in Europe will force a change of direction. At this point such a change seems probable for Greece, but, unfortunately less probable for Europe and, I am afraid, the broader developments could affect negatively the Greek scene as well.
Far from being an isolated phenomenon, the Greek case is the most vivid expression of a course of Europe that is untenable. Policies that bring massive unemployment, poverty, inequalities and insecurity, measures that are imposed without a minimum of democratic consensus, inter-state relations that remind of colonial times are no ways to defeat those who are out to destroy the EU. Europe cannot survive out of the fear of people to leave it. We need policies that focus more on employment and growth. We need more solidarity. If people are not convinced there is something good for them in the EU, they will naturally abandon it, sooner or later. So, for Europe and the international community, saving Greece, genuinely assisting it to exit from the present quagmire, is not an act of charity, but of enlightened self-interest.

And Now?
On the international scene, Brexit and Donald Trump’s election dramatically increase uncertainties over the EU’s future and its very survival. Euroscepticism and far-right forces are on the rise throughout Europe. For the first time, a collapse of the EU is conceivable; Greece would suffer most from it.
Prospects for a more benevolent attitude towards Greece by its lenders are less likely today than last June. Supporters of Greece, such as the Obama, Hollande and Renzi administrations have left or are leaving the scene, while their successors (even discarding further worst case scenarios, with Le Pen and Grillo) are unlikely to have the same positive attitude. In Germany, the mood is for even less solidarity and the September elections are expected to confirm this trend.
These developments will most probably frustrate the Greek government’s hopes for substantial debt relief and an ensuing easing of the austerity imposed on the country. Recent and ongoing negotiations seem to confirm this grim picture. The IMF, which at some point appeared to support a change of course, is likely to settle for a ‘compromise’ with Berlin at the expense of Greece, by which more austerity will compensate for lack of debt relief; alternatively it might leave the programme, thus further complicating its implementation. Schäuble for his part, always in strong position in Germany, multiplies provocative statements reminding that Grexit is still on his agenda. It is increasingly unclear how Greece will service its debt after 2018: substantial debt relief, new EU loans or borrowing on the financial markets seem unlikely and more austerity would be politically and economically suicidal.
Predictably, the Tsipras government is overwhelmed, trapped in an almost impossible situation. True, doomsday forecasts by the opposition have not materialised: the programme is broadly on track and some of its objectives, including that on the primary surplus, are surpassed; the Government’s parliamentary majority is not threatened; and SYRIZA’s efforts for a socially fair distribution of burdens is evident. Yet, the party has difficulty in focusing on policy objectives that would satisfy and mobilise public opinion or at least its own supporters, yielding visible results. Continued and cumulative austerity is increasingly, if unfairly, attributed to the present government. Blunders of its own making, such as an unfortunate attempt to cleanse the media landscape, add to the misfortunes imposed from abroad. Under present conditions, the government’s inexperience and related inefficiency is strongly felt. As a result, SYRIZA’s ratings have dropped. 
An additional challenge comes from Greece’s eastern neighbour. In a context of rapid backsliding into authoritarianism, Erdoğan has lately been making aggressive statements and gestures towards Greece, even questioning the borders established by the Lausanne Treaty. While Greek reactions are on the whole measured, exacerbation of foreign policy issues reveals the existence of a potentially dangerous nationalist component within the government. Besides, the refugee crisis could return at any moment, in the likely event the EU-Turkey deal would collapse.
Faced with a heap of obstacles, Tsipras seems to hesitate between fighting on and attempting a “heroic exit” by calling early elections (which he would probably lose). He has repeatedly declared he will not “desert”, but informed observers do not exclude the option of elections. For their part, the opposition parties insist on their all-out war against the government and the conservative New Democracy keeps asking for elections. In reality, no one is particularly eager to get the hot potato. Still, a return to power of the old guard seems now more likely, though nothing indicates it would better address the country’s problems. On the contrary, New Democracy’s incoherent mixture of neo-liberalism, old-style clientelism and rightist populism is a recipe for further disasters. Also, its alignment in Europe with the forces that bear the main responsibility for the Union’s present state, would place Greece in the wrong camp in any attempt to salvage the European project. An interesting development could be an observed change of direction in the socialist PASOK party which could be turning away from its alliance with the conservatives. This could open the way for a new coalition, whereby PASOK would replace the populist ANEL as SYRIZA’s partner, in government or in opposition.
To sum up, in a period where the deepest pessimism reigns in Europe and the West, it would be difficult to feel differently in Greece. Uncertainties dominate. However, most of the likely scenarios are bad. What seems increasingly clear is that the fate of Greece is closely –if not fully- tied to the course Europe will take in the coming months and years.

(first published in CHRONOS magazine, 25 Jan. 2017)
From chronos.fairead.net

duminică, 8 martie 2015

De ce este Elvetia cel mai antifragil loc de pe planeta?

Unele lucruri trag foloase de pe urma socurilor si cresc cand sunt expuse la volatilitate, la aleatoriu, dezordine si factori de stres si iubesc aventura, riscul si incertitudinea. Si totusi nu exista un termen pentru a desemna antonimul exact al lui “fragil”. Hai sa-i zicem “antifragil”.
Randurile de mai sus sunt scrise de Nassim Nicholas Taleb si au aparut in cartea “Antifragil. Ce avem de castigat de pe urma dezordinii”.
Taleb atrage atentia ca antifragilitatea inseamna mai mult decat rezistenta sau robustete. Rezistentul face fata socurilor si ramane acelasi; antifragilul devine mai bun. Aceasta proprietate se afla in spatele tuturor lucrurilor care s-au schimbat pe parcursul timpului: evolutie, cultura, idei, revolutii, sisteme politice, inovatie tehnologica, succes cultural si economic, supravietuire colectiva, retete bune, ridicarea oraselor, sistemele juridice, padurile ecuatoriale, rezistenta bacteriilor si chiar si existenta noastra ca specie.  
Potrivit lui Taleb, Elvetia este cel mai antifragil loc de pe planeta: castiga de pe urma socurilor produse in restul lumii.
Si recenta criza mondiala a facut ca Elvetia sa fie mai sigura decat a fost vreodata, determinand o crestere dramatica a valorii valutei tarii.
Lenin a trait in Elvetia si obisnuia sa joace sah intr-o cafenea din Zurich cu poetul dadaist Tristan Tzara. Dar in Elvetia a trait nu doar cel care a planuit primul stat communist, ci si victima sa, aristocratul rus emigrat Vladimir Nabokov.
Gazduirea rosilor, dar si a albilor, a bolsevicilor si aristocratilor rusi albi, pare sa fie una dintre principalele preocupari ale Confederatiei Elvetiene.
Orase insemnate precum Zurich, Geneva sau Lausanne pastreaza urmele refugiatilor politici care si-au cautat adapost in ele, de la membrii familiei regale iraniene expulzati de islamisti pana la ultimul potentat african care isi pune in aplicare “planul B”.
Pana si Voltaire si-a petrecut ceva timp ascunzandu-se la Ferney, o suburbie a Genevei. El dadea fuga aici dupa ce il insulta pe regale Frantei sau Biserica Catolica.
Ceea ce oamenii nu stiu de Voltaire insa este ca isi cauta protectia acolo si din ratiuni financiare. Era un barbat realizat prin forte proprii, un negustor instarit, investitor si dealer speculant. Merita remarcat ca mare parte din bogatia lui venea din antifragilitatea factorilor de stres, deoarece a inceput sa-si puna pe picioare averea chiar la inceputul exilului.
Asadar, in Elvetia exista si refugiati de alte tipuri, asemenea lui Voltaire: refugiati financiar, veniti din locuri framantate, recognoscibili dupa hainele lor scumpe si plictistoare, dupa vocabularul anost, eticheta nenaturala si ceasurile scumpe (lucioase). Cu alte cuvinte, niste non-Voltaire. Ca multi oameni bogati se simt indreptatiti sa rada la propriile glume. Acesti oameni (greoi) nu cauta adapost pentru propria persoana; de fapt, capitalurile lor sunt acelea care isi cauta refugiu.
Aceasta mare varietate de oameni impreuna cu portofelele lor vin in Elvetia pentru adapost, siguranta si stabilitate. Insa acesti refugiati nu observa ceva evident: cea mai stabila tara din lume nu are guvern. Si nu este stabila in ciuda faptului ca nu are guvern, ci este stabila pentru ca nu are unul. Cereti-le unor cetateni elvetieni sa spuna numele presedintelui lor si calculati procentul persoanelor care pot face asta; de obicei, pot sa-i numeasca pe presedintii Frantei si ai Statelor Unite, dar nu stiu cum il cheama pe al lor. Unitatea lor monetara functioneaza cel mai bine si totusi banca lor centrala este micuta.
Oare acesti politicieni care isi petrec aici timpul inainte de a se intoarce la putere in patria lor reamarca absenta guvernarii, accepta faptul ca se gasesc in Elvetia tocmai datorita acestei absente a guvernarii si isi adapteaza ideile despre statele – natiuni si sistemele politice conform ei? Nici pomeneala.
Nu este chiar adevarat ca elvetienii nu au guvern, subliniaza totusi Taleb. De fapt, ei nu au un guvern central mare sau ceea ce se numeste in vorbirea curenta “guvern”; sunt guvernati complet de jos in sus, de un fel de municipalitati, entitati regionale numite “cantoane” , mini-state aproape suverane, unite intr-o confederatie.
Volatilitatea exista din belsug, cu dusmanii intre rezidenti la nivelul luptelor pentru fantanile de apa. Asta nu e neaparat placut. Insa aceasta forma de dictatura de jos in sus ofera protectie impotriva romantismului utopiilor, dat fiind ca, intr-o atmosfera atat de neintelectuala, nu se pot naste idei marete. Sistemul produce insa stabilitate – stabilitate plicticoasa- la toate nivelurile cu putinta.
De remarcat, de asemenea, si ca scenele hidos de tipatoare peste care dai in Elvetia, peste tot in Geneva, in unele parti din Zurich si indeosebi in statiunile de schi, ca Gstaadt si St. Moritz, nu sunt produsul direct al tarii , ci rezultatul succesului ei, deoarece Elvetia actioneaza ca un magnet asupra refugiatilor care doresc sa scape de taxe.
Sa observam pentru moment ca aceasta este ultima tara care nu este organizata ca stat-natiune, ci mai degraba ca un manunchi de mici municipalitati, lasate in voia lor.
Un conglomerat de municipalitati cu fermecatoare inamicitii provinciale, cu luptele lor interne si cu oameni care se pandesc unii pe altii, se organizeaza intr-un stat blajin si stabil. Dupa cum venitul soferului de taxi prezinta instabilitate de la o zi la alta, dar este stabil la nivel anual, la fel si Elvetia demonstreaza stabilitate la nivelul agregatului pentru ca ansamblul cantoanelor da nastere unui sistem stabil.
Modul in care oamenii gestioneaza treburile locale este foarte diferit de modul in care gestioneaza cheltuielile publice mari si abstracte, in trecutul indepartat, am trait in unitati mici si in triburi, ne-am descurcat mai bine in unitati mici.
Contactul vizual cu semenii schimba comportamentul unei persoane. O persoana pe care o vezi la biserica duminica dimineata se va simti stanjenita pentru greselile sale, deci va fi si mai responsabila pentru ele. La scara mare, ceilalti sunt unitati abstracte, la carma se afla mai degraba creierul functionarului civil, nu emotiile acestuia – cu cifre, foi de calcul, statistici.
Suntem miscati mai usor de un bebelus care plange langa noi decat de 1.000 care mor in alta parte si nu ajung in sufrageria noastra prin intermediul televizorului. Primul caz e o tragedie, celalalt este o statistica. Energia noastra emotionala este oarba la probabilitate.
Deci, problema este ca, prin crearea unor birocratii, ii punem pe functionarii civili in pozitia din care iau decizii bazate pe chestiuni abstracte si teoretice, cu iluzia ca le vor lua intr-un mod rational, explicabil.
Si sa mai luam in calcul si faptul ca lobbystii – iritanta rasa a lobbyistilor – nu pot exista intr-o municipalitate sau intr-o regiune mica. Europenii gratie centralizarii unei puteri in Comisia Europeana de la Bruxelles , descopera cu repeziciune existenta acestor mutanti care vin sa manipuleze democratia de dragul unei mari corporatii.
Influentand o singura decizie sau reglementare la Bruxelles, un singur lobbyist da o lovitura de zile mari. Este un castig mult mai mare – la un cost mai redus – decat in cadrul municipalitatilor unde e nevoie de armate de lobbysti. Si sa luam in considerare si celalalt efect al scarii: este mai putin probabil ca niste companii mici sa aiba lobbysti.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb conchide spunand ca Elvetia este, poate, cea mai de succes tara din istorie, si totusi, in mod traditional nivelul educatiei universitare a fost slab in comparatie cu restul natiunilor bogate. Sistemul ei, chiar si in domeniul bancar din zilele noastre, s-a bazat mai degraba pe tiparele uceniciei aproape vocationale, decat pe acelea teoretice . Cu alte cuvinte, pe techne (mestesuguri si pricepere), nu pe episteme (cunoastere din carti, cunoasterea definitiei lucrurilor).
Sursa BlogulluiBalan

joi, 22 ianuarie 2015

Invazie financiara anuntata!!

Preşedintele BCE, italianul şcolit pe Wall Street Mario Draghi, a anunţat că instituţia sa va cumpăra active publice şi private din zona euro în valoare de peste 1.100 de miliarde de euro, respectiv 60 de miliarde de euro pe lună începând cu martie până la finalul lunii septembrie 2016, decizie considerată ca arma supremă a zonei euro în lupta cu deflaţia şi cu anemia economiei.

Principalele declaraţii ale lui Mario Draghi
În martie 2015, BCE va începe să cumpere obligaţiuni denominate în euro evaluate în categoria recomandate investiţiilor, emise de guvernele din zona euro şi agenţiile şi instituţiile europene pe piaţa secundară (…). Unele criterii suplimentare de eligibilitate vor fi aplicate în cazul ţărilor aflate în programe de ajustare cu UE/FMI
O proporţie de 20% din achiziţiile de active vor fi supuse unui regim de partajare a riscurilor. BCE va deţine 8% din achiziţiile suplimentare de titluri, pentru care riscurile vor fi automat suportate în comun.
În plus, pentru 12% din activele cumpărate în cadrul programului de către băncile centrale naţionale riscurile vor fi de asemenea comune
♦Creşterea agresivă a programului de achiziţii de obligaţiuni al BCE va contribui la revenirea inflaţiei către nivelul de 2%, dar se menţin riscurile economice
♦În cămara BCE vor intra obligaţiuni din toată gama de scadenţe, de la doi ani la 30 de ani;
♦Draghi a asigurat că programul este proiectat astfel încât să fie evitată “finanţarea monetară” a datoriilor guvernelor;
♦În privinţa Greciei, economia-problemă a zonei euro, Draghi a explicat că BCE nu are “reguli speciale” legate de obligaţiunile acestei ţări;
♦Aceasta înseamnă că achiziţiile băncii vor acoperi şi active elene, o veste bună pentru partidul aflat la guvernare în Grecia, care se va lupta duminică în alegeri parlamentare cu o formaţiune radicală antiausteritate;

♦În ceea ce priveşte apariţia bulelor pe pieţe, o îngrijorare legată de efectele QE în SUA şi Marea Britanie, Draghi a explicat că problema va fi rezolvată la nivelul fiecărui stat prin instrumente macroprudenţiale şi nu prin politici monetare;
♦Ar fi o mare greşeală ca ţările din Uniunea Europeană să considere acest program ca o invitaţie la indisciplină fiscală;
♦BCE a luat această decizie pentru a contracara doi factori nefavorabili, inflaţia slabă şi creşterea economică anemică, a spus Draghi;
♦El a admis că măsurile luate de instituţia sa anul trecut au fost “insuficiente” pentru a alunga pericolul deflaţiei;
♦Achiziţiile de active vor majora semnificativ balanţa BCE şi vor întări încrederea în proiecţiile BCE privind traiectoria dobânzilor. Aceşti factori ar trebui să consolideze cererea şi creşterea creditării, ducând în cele din urmă la accelerarea inflaţiei la aproape 2%, a explicat Draghi;
Programe similare, de printare masivă de bani pentru achiziţii de active, implementate la câteva luni după izbucnirea crizei economice mondiale de către Rezerva Federală americană şi de Banca Angliei au impulsionat relansarea economiei americane şi a celei britanice şi mai ales pieţele.
 
O mare parte din aceşti bani au fost duşi de investitorii în cautarea de randamente mai mari – în SUA, ca şi acum în zona euro, dobânzile sunt aproape de zero - în economii emergente precum cele din Asia şi America de Sud. Tot în căutarea randamentelor mai mari, investitorii vor căuta cu siguranţă să facă profit în Europa emergentă, inclusiv în România, cu banii ieftini ai BCE.
FMI estimează că economia americană va creşte cu 3,6% anul acesta, de trei ori mai rapid decât PIB-ul zonei euro.
 
Măsura de a injecta 1.100 de miliarde de euro în economie reflect determinarea Preşedintelui BCE, Mario Draghi, de a opri ameninţarea deflaţiei şi de a pune economia celor 19 state din zona euro înapoi pe calea spre creştere economică



luni, 5 ianuarie 2015

De ce este Danemarca tara cu cei mai fericiti locuitori din lume?

Danemarca a fost declarata recent tara cu cei mai fericiti locuitori din lume, in cadrul unui clasament intocmit de Organizatia Natiunilor Unite.
Potrivit profesorului de economie de la Universitatea British Columbia, John Helliwel, tarile "fericite" au in comun factori precum un venit mare pe cap de locuitor, o viata sanatoasa si absenta coruptiei la nivelul liderilor.

Pe langa acestea insa, mai sunt caracteristice alte trei conditii aflate la un nivel mult mai personal al fiecarui individ: simtul sprijinului social, libertatea fiecaruia de a face alegerile pentru propria viata si o cultura a generozitatii.

Huffington Post a incercat sa explice de ce este Danemarca tara cu cei mai fericiti locuitori din lume, facand referire la cele sase caracteristici specifice economiei, societatii si culturii acestei tari.

1.Danemarca sustine parintii

Familiiile daneze primesc in total 52 de saptamani de concediu parental, iar copiii acestora au acces la ingrijire in mod gratuit sau la costuri foarte mici.

Educatia timpurie de calitate este asociata cu bunastarea si sanatatea pe parcursul intregii vietii.

In plus, acest lucru face ca 79% dintre mame sa isi permita sa se intoarca la serviciul anterior, ele contribuind cu 38% la veniturile unei familii cu copii.

2.Ingrijirea sanatatii este un drept civil si o sursa de suport social

Cetatenii danezi se asteapta sa primeasca ingrijire medicala de calitate, insa ce este mai important este ca acestia cunosc cum sa foloseasca sistemul in interesul sanatatii lor.

Danezii contacteaza un medic primar, in medie, de sapte ori in fiecare an, acest sistem fiind conceput pe principiul ca pacientii trebuie sa primeasca tratament la cel mai apropiat nivel, medicul primar luand decizia daca o persoana trebuie sa consulte un medic de specialitate mai departe.

3.Egalitatea de gen este o prioritate

Danemarca se regaseste constant in topul primelor 10 state din lume in ceea ce priveste egalitatea de gen. Chiar daca nicio tara din lume nu a atins pana acum egalitatea deplina, Danemarca si celelalte state nordice sunt aproape de aceasta tinta, unul dintre principalele motive fiind constituit de prezenta femeilor in functiile de conducere.

Statele nordice au fost printre primele care au acordat femeilor dreptul de a vota (Suedia in 1919, Norvegia in 1913, Islanda si Danemarca in 1915, Finlanda in 1906).

In Danemarca, Suedia si Norvegia, partidele politice au introdus in mod voluntar, in anii '70, o cota obligatorie a numarului de femei membre, ceea ce a dus la cresterea reprezentarii femeilor in politica.

In Danemarca, aceasta masura a fost eliminata nemaifiind necesar nici un stimulent in aceasta privinta. Ca urmare a masurii, in prezent tara are prima femeie prim-ministru din istorie, Helle Thorning-Schidt.

4.Mersul pe bicicleta, un lucru normal

In cel mai populat oras al Danemarcei, capitala Copenhaga, 50% dintre locuitori se deplaseaza pe bicicleta atunci cand merg la scoala sau la serviciu. Acest lucru nu contribuie numai la sanatatea locuitorilor si la reducerea emisiilor de carbon, dar si la dezvoltarea economiei locale, dupa cum arata revista Forbes: pentru fiecare kilometru de folosire a bicicletei in locul masinii, platitorii de taxe economisesc 7,8 centi pentru masurile de combatere a poluarii aerului, accidentelor, zgomotului si deteriorarii infrastructurii.

Biciclistii din Copenhaga acopera zilnic o distanta de 1,2 milioane de kilometri, producand o economie anuala de 34 milioane de dolari.

Pe langa beneficiile economice, o calatorie zilnica de 30 de minute pe bicicleta creste speranta de viata cu unu pana la doi ani de zile.

5.Cultura daneza "profita" de conditiile grele de mediu

Ceea ce in limba romana putem numi confort sau atmosfera placuta, danezii au denumit hygge. Acesta este considerat de multi ca mijlocul prin care danezii incearca sa combata intunecimea care se abate asupra tarii in lunile de iarna.

Intr-un loc in care soarele straluceste doar sapte ore pe zi in timpul solstitiului de iarna, prezenta intunericului accentueaza depresia si sentimentele triste.

Ideea unui loc confortabil, plin de dragoste si toleranta, combinat cu alimentele asociate cu hygge (ciocolata, cafeaua sau vinul) pot ajuta la atenuarea unora dintre cele mai negative efecte psihologice ale sezonului rece.

6.Responsabilitatea individuala si colectiva

Danezii nu prioritizeaza siguranta sociala doar pentru anumite beneficii; aici exista un sens real al responsabilitatii colective si al apartenentei sociale. Aceasta datorie civica, combinata cu interesul economic si echilibrul dintre munca si viata privata, conduc la un nivel inalt al voluntariatului.

Peste 40% dintre danezi practica munca voluntara intr-o asociatie culturala sau sportiva, ONG sau organizatii politice, arata datele guvernului danez. La o populatie de 5,5 milioane de locuitori, in Danemarca exista un numar de aproximativ 101.000 de organizatii.

Valorea muncii voluntare este estimata la 35,3 miliarde de coroane daneze (6,5 miliarde de dolari). Combinata cu cresterea valorii din sectorul non-profit, subventiile publice si taxele de membru, impactul total reprezinta 9,6 la suta din PIB-ul tarii.

Danezii sunt insa si un popor foarte activ in procesul democratic. De exemplu, la ultimele alegeri din septembrie 2011, 87,7% din totalul populatiei s-a prezentat la urne.

Astfel, nu este de mirare faptul ca Universitatea din Zurich si Centrul de Studii in Stiinte Sociale din Berlin au acordat Danemarcei cel mai mare rating pentru democratie, dintr-un total de 30 de sisteme democratii consolidate. 

Sursa ziare.com

marți, 16 septembrie 2014

INFOGRAFIE Referendum în Scoţia. Secesiunea Regatului Unit va declanşa un tsunami separatist în Europa .

Referendumul prin care scoţienii vor decide dacă vor independenţa de Regatul Unit ar putea deschide o adevărată Cutie a Pandorei în Europa, alimentând tendinţele separatiste din mai bine de 10 state.
Referendum în Scoţia: Regatul Unit va fi nevoit să-şi schimbe emblemat... VIDEO Manifestaţii la Edinburgh în apărarea Marii Britanii, înaintea r... Să califici un scoţian drept „englez” poate fi considerat ca un afront... Cu doar câteva zile până când se va decide soarta Scoţiei, destinele Regatului Unit şi Uniunii Europene rămân la fel de greu de prevăzut. Deocamdată, cele mai recente sondaje, de la 11 septembrie, arată o revenire în frunte a unioniştilor, care s-ar bucura de 42% din voturi. De cealaltă parte, 40% dintre scoţieni vor vota pentru ruperea de Marea Britanie. Însă existenţa unui procent de 17% de indecişi – adică aproximativ o jumătate de milion de oameni – este cea care cauzează fluctuaţii majore în sondaje de la o zi la alta şi, în final, va determina rezultatele plebiscitului care va avea consecinţe asupra întregii Europe.    Dacă scoţienii vor decide, pe 18 septembrie, că nu mai vor să rămână alături de Marea Britanie, rezultatele referendumului vor reprezenta un precedent periculos pentru întreaga Europă, unde, de-a lungul ultimilor 20 de ani, au apărut şi s-au consolidat numeroase focare separatiste.    „Dacă scoţienii votează pentru independenţă, va deveni extrem de dificil pentru guvernul spaniol să refuze în continuare un drept democratic similar pentru cataloni şi basci. Separatiştii flamanzi vor intensifica presiunile asupra Belgiei, iar Liga Nordului ar putea începe o nouă viaţă în Italia”, notează cotidianul american „The New York Times”.    Însă, înainte de a ajunge în Spania sau Italia, entuziasmul separatist al scoţienilor se va revărsa mult mai aproape de casă. Partidul Sinn Fein din Irlanda de Nord militează de ani buni pentru un stat independent de Marea Britanie şi unirea cu Irlanda. Pe fondul crizei economice, ideea a început să rezoneze cu o parte tot mai mare a irlandezilor. 

Catalanii, la un pas de independenţă   Cel mai aproape de independenţă par, într-adevăr, catalanii. Mişcare de independeţă apărută încă din secolul al XVII-lea a luat cu adevărat avânt în anii 1900, însă a fost reprimată ferm de Madrid de fiecare dată. Acum, catalanii au anunţat că, în ciuda ameninţărilor guvernului spaniol, vor organiza un referendum de secesiune în 2015. Majoritatea covârşitoare a populaţiei doreşte ruperea de Spania.    Cu totul altă strategie adoptă militanţii Eta din Ţara Bascilor, care nu organizează referendumuri, ci atentate. Cunoscută pentru violenţă, grupării Eta i se atribuie peste 820 de crime în numele independenţei. La alegerile legislative locale din 2012, partidele pro-secesiune au câştigat peste 55% din voturi.    În total, patru focare separatiste ameninţă să „macine” Spania. Pe lângă Catalonia şi Ţara Bascilor, localnicii din Andaluzia şi Galicia vor urmări cu mai mult interes decât restul europenilor rezultatele referendumului din Scoţia. Însă Spania nu este singura ţară puternică din UE afectată de curentul separatist.  Franţa luptă cu această problemă pe două fronturi – Bretania şi Corsica. În aceasta din urmă, localnicii simt că trăiesc într-o colonie, în timp ce bretonii îşi anunţă cu fiecare ocazie descendenţa celtică şi susţin că nu sunt francezi.    Soarta Transnistriei, legată de Ucraina   Mai spre est, Roma trebuie să se confrunte cu separatiştii care vor înfiinţarea Republicii Sardinia şi a Statului Liber al Tirolului de Sud. În această regiune din urmă, aflată în nordul Italiei, există şi un puternic curent pro-unirea cu Austria.    Însă crizele separatiste care afectează în mod direct România se află la doar o aruncătură de băţ. Deznodământul războiului civil din Ucraina, unde separatiştii proruşi se luptă pentru independenţa de Kiev şi rămânerea sub influenţa Rusiei, va decide în mare parte şi soarta Transnistriei, regiune separatistă din Republica Moldova. În ultimul an, şi găgăuzii din Moldova şi-au intensificat retorica pro-secesiune, profitând de tensiunile din Transnistria şi conflictul din Ucraina. 

Sursa adevarul

miercuri, 8 ianuarie 2014

Cum este reglementata vanzarea terenurilor in tarile UE. Cum e in Romania…

Romania este singura tara din Europa care nu a facut nicio notificare catre UE pentru instituirea de restrictii la cumpararea terenurilor de catre straini. Rezultatul – 40% din suprafata arabila a tarii de 10 mil. de hectare este acum detinuta de straini cu acte sau fara. La aceasta suprafata se mai adauga alte cateva milioane de hectare detinute de arendasi straini care au drept de preemptiune la cumparare. Plus cateva milioane de hectare de padure. De mentionat ca romanii nu detin nici macar un hectar de teren arabil in vreo tara UE, potrivit datelor confederatiilor de agricultori. Tratatele de aderare, incheiate de tarile UE lasa la latitudinea fiecarei tari problematica vanzarii terenurilor catre straini, acesta fiind una care tine de siguranta alimentara a fiecarui stat. Cu alte cuvinte, problematica vanzarii terenurilor este una nationala, nu una comunitara. Tarile UE care au refuzat sa-si liberalizeze piata funciara si au notificat UE in consecinta nu au primit nicio sanctiune.
In tratatul de aderare la UE incheiat de Romania se precizeaza ca terenul arabil este un “capital”, in vreme ce tari precum Ungaria, de exemplu, au precizat in taratul de aderare ca terenurile sunt “bun national”.
Tratatul de aderare a fost “negociat” cu UE in anul 2004, in timpul mandatului premierului Adrian Nastase.
Negocierile au fost purtate de o delegatie condusa de ministrul de Finante de atunci, Mihai Tanasescu. Din echipa de negociere a facut parte si actualul ministru al Agriculturii, Daniel Constantin.
ROMANIA: Romania este singura tara din Uniunea Europeana care nu a facut nicio notificare cu privire la vanzarea terenurilor catre straini, in vreme ce toate celelalte tari au notificat UE cu privire la interdictiile aplicate.
In Romania, persoanele juridice straine nu au niciul fel de restrictie la cumpararea de teren arabil si paduri, iar singura restrictie aplicata persoanelor fizice este preeptiunea vecinilor de lot la cumpararea terenului scos la vanzare. De asemenea, pot cumpara teren in Romania si apatrizii sau cetatenii non-UE daca au domiciul la momentul achizitiei intr-unul din statele UE.
Pana in prezent strainii detin cu acte, potrivit datelor APIA, 800.000 de hectare de teren arabil. In total, strainii detin cu acte sau neintabulate aproximativ 4 milioane de hectare de teren arabil, respectiv 40% din suprafata arabila a tarii. La acesta suprafata se adauga mai multe milioane de hectare de paduri aflate in proprietatea strainilor.
Daca polonezii au stabilit distanta de la granite pana la care se poate face cumpararea de teren de catre straini la 150 de km, la noi aceasta cu greu s-a majorat de la 10 km la 20 km doar la presiunile Ministerului Apararii Nationale.
POLONIA: trebuie sa faci dovada ca ai rezidenta timp de 12 ani in tara pentru a putea cumpara teren arabil. Polonia a limitat cumpărarea terenurilor la 150 de kilometri de graniţă.
BULGARIA: Parlamentul a votat pentru extinderea până în 2020 a interdicţiei de vânzare de terenuri agricole către străini. Comisia Europeană a avertizat că aceasta reprezintă o încălcare a angajamentelor internaţionale ale Bulgariei şi că Sofia ar putea fi pasibilă de sancţiuni financiare. În perspectiva aderării la UE în 2007, Bulgaria a modificat Constituţia, ridicând interdicţia impusă străinilor de a achiziţiona terenuri agricole. Un moratoriu care expiră la 1 ianuarie 2014 a fost totuşi introdus şi parlamentarii au decis să-l prelungească până la 1 ianuarie 2020.
UCRAINA: Parlamentul ucrainean a decis, în noiembrie 2012, prelungirea interdicţiei asupra vânzării terenurilor agricole până la 1 ianuarie 2016. Ucraina are o suprafaţă agricolă de 41,6 milioane de hectare, din care terenul arabil reprezintă 32,48 milioane de hectare. Aproximativ şapte milioane de loturi sunt deţinute de persoane fizice. Interdicţia asupra vânzării de terenuri agricole în Ucraina există din 1996 şi urma să expire la 1 ianuarie 2013.
UNGARIA: noile norme europene privind vânzarea fără restricţii a terenurilor agricole ar trebui să fie aplicate începând cu data de 15 iunie 2014, însă Guvernul ungar încearcă să-şi protejeze terenurile agricole prin câteva măsuri drastice. Astfel, persoanele din Ungaria despre care se constată că sunt implicate în vânzarea de teren agricol ungar către străini vor fi pasibile de până la cinci ani de închisoare. “Terenurile agricole ungare vor fi deţinute de unguri”, a afirmat şi primul ministru Viktor Orban, după semnarea unui acord, la Budapesta, cu şeful Camerei agricole ungare. Guvernul ungar a decis, încă din luna aprilie, să ofere spre concesionare 200 de mii de hectare de teren arabil către agricultori, în cadrul unui nou program care se aplică parcelelor de teren care sunt în prezent închiriate prin contracte ce expiră până la 31 mai 2017. Scopul programului este consolidarea fermelor de familie, precum şi a celor mici şi mijlocii. Ungaria intenţionează să reducă ponderea fermelor mari la 20 la sută din terenul arabil total, faţă de 50 la sută în prezent. Prin aceste măsuri, legislaţia ungară încearcă să apere agricultura de speculaţii şi de “capital străin”. Se consideră că până la un milion de hectare de teren agricol din Ungaria au fost vândute deja în mod disimulat unor străini, menţionează publicaţia MTI.
ESTONIA: Guvernul Estonian a facut notificare catre UE, iar acum a scos un draft de lege care prevede ca nu poti cumpara teren decat daca esti cetatean estonian.
GERMANIA: nu poti cumpara teren decat daca faci parte din economia Germaniei, adica, daca faci dovada ca platesti taxe acolo. Germania face apel la un instrumentar sofisticat de protectie a propriilor agricultori si a resurselor funciare nationale – instrumente juridice de preemptiune a colectivitatii locale in favoarea interesului public, legislatie nationala, dublata de regulamente locale, instrumente fiscale, instrumente structurale de amenajare funciara publica, instrumente financiare.
FRANTA: legislatia prevede că proprietarul nu poate face ce vrea pe terenul aflat in proprietatea sa, pentru că acesta face parte din patrimoniul naţional. Franta face apel la un instrumentar sofisticat de protectie a propriilor agricultori si a resurselor funciare nationale – instrumente juridice de preemptiune a colectivitatii locale in favoarea interesului public, instrumente fiscale, instrumente structurale de amenajare funciara publica, instrumente financiare. In Franta, nu mai putin de cinci ministere trebuie sa-si dea acordul pentru incheierea unei tranzactii funciare. Dupa obtinearea acordului de la autoritatile central urmeaza aceeasi procedura pentru obtinerea acordului autoritatilor locale. Practic, toate aceste masuri fac imposibila vanzarea terenurilor catre straini.
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